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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Jurisdiction lies with this Court pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j).

On November 1, 1989, a judgment (R. 117-119;

Addendum A hereto) was entered in the Third Judicial District
Court of Salt Lake County, The Honorable Timothy R. Hanson,
granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment.

The

plaintiff appealed from the order entered November 1, 1989.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Did the district court apply the correct interpretation
of the motor club surety bond and the related statutes in determining that there is no liability imposed upon the insurer?
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND CASES
The determinative statutes and cases believed by
respondent to support respondent's arguments are:
Statutes
Utah Code Ann. §31A-11-102 (1989 Supp.);
Utah Code Ann. §41-16-1(1), 1953.
Cases
Dennis Dillon Oldsmobile, GMC, Inc. v. Zdunich, 668 P.2d 557, 560
(Utah 1983); Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105, 1107-1108 (Utah
1982); Western Surety Co. v. Murphy, 754 P.2d 1237 (Utah App.
1988); City of Wichita v. Home Cab Co., 101 P.2d 219 (Kan. 1940).
Other Authorities
Couch On Insurance 2d, §1587 (1984)
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings
and Disposition in the Court Below
The defendant agrees with the plaintiff's description of
the nature of the case, the court's proceedings and the
disposition of the court below.
Statement of Facts
The defendant agrees with the plaintiff's statement of
facts as stated in the plaintiff's brief.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Inasmuch as the motor club bond issued by the defendant
has been given in compliance with the statutes governing motor
clubs, the scope of the statute and the bond must be read in such
a manner so as to relate to the purpose and the subject discussed
by legislature in creating the statutes governing motor clubs.
The statutes address motor clubs and the offer of motor club
services and not the liability of motor clubs or its principals in
general.

The reasonable interpretation of the statute and the

bond, and the liabilities imposed do not include the sale of capital notes.

If such an interpretation were adhered to, the motor

club bond would be transformed in nature to a liability policy for
the principals that would include coverage for activities far
beyond the scope of usual motor club activities.
Despite the rule that a surety bond is to be construed
against the surety and in favor of those who are insured, even
under such strict construction, the actions of the principals of
American Drivers Legal Services in issuing and selling capital
-2-

notes did not constitute any type of motor club services and thus
there is no liability under the bond and no duty on the part of
defendant to make payment.
ARGUMENT
DEFENDANT HAS NO DUTY TO MAKE PAYMENT UNDER
THE BOND AS THE PRINCIPALS FROM AMERICAN
DRIVERS LEGAL SERVICES FAITHFULLY FURNISHED
AND RENDERED MOTOR CLUB SERVICESThe issue before this Court in determining whether or not
the lower court correctly interpreted the subject bond centers on
whether the issuing and selling of capital notes by the principals
of American Drivers Legal Services can be construed as part of the
motor club's services.
The plaintiff has asserted in its brief that inasmuch as
the bond language is allegedly broader than the statutory language,
the bond should be construed against the surety to include coverage for the issue and sale of capital notes.

Plaintiff is criti-

cal of the defendant's bond language suggesting that the bond
language could have easily limited coverage to the "selling or
rendering motor club services" rather than the current bond language of the "selling or rendering any of Principal's services."
Plaintiff, however, has failed to provide a reasonable
interpretation of both the bond and the statutes governing the
bond.

Plaintiff has failed to establish that the issue and sale

of capital notes is part of motor club services and that the
intent of the legislature in requiring a motor club bond included
coverage for anything other than motor club services.
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Motor Club's Services Defined
Former Utah Code Ann. §41-16-1(1) defined motor club
services as follows:
Motor club service shall consist of rendering,
furnishing or procuring insurance service,
towing service, emergency road service, license
service, theft service, claims adjustment service,
bail bond service, discount service, map service,
towing service, legal service on a reimbursement
basis, or any one or more of such services to
persons in connection with ownership, operation,
use or maintenance of a motor vehicle by a person
in consideration of such person being or becoming
a member of an association or club rendering,
procuring or furnishing such service, or being
or becoming entitled to receive membership or
other motor club services therefrom.
The current statute defining motor club services was
effective for at least a period of time in which American Drivers
Legal Services, Inc. offered and sold capital notes.

The current

statute provides as follows:
(1) Motor clubs authorized under this chapter
may provide or arrange for the following
services:
(a) service as agent or broker in
obtaining insurance coverage from
authorized insurers, subject to
Chapter 23;
(b) provision of, or payment for, legal
services and costs in the defense
of traffic offenses or other legal
problems connected with the ownership
or use of a motor vehicle, provided
the maximum amount payable for any
one incident is not more than 100
times the annual charge for the motor
club contract;
(c) guaranteed arrest bond certificates
and cash bond guarantees as specified
under §31A-11-112;
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(d) payment of specified expenses resulting
from an automobile accident, other than
expenses for personal injury or for
damage to an automobile, provided the
maximum amount payable for any one
accident is not more than 100 times the
annual charge for the motor club contract;
(e) towing and emergency road services and
theft services; and
(f) any services relating to travel not
involving the transfer and distribution
of risk.
Utah Code Ann. §31A-11-102 (1989 Supp.).
The issuing and selling of capital notes '-ap in. no way be
included as part of motor club services i:rvi-vr * b.& vr^adest
interpretation of motor club services under both the former statute and the current statute.

Additionally, the language of the

bond does not broaden i n ai i> A/a,;y 11 1 e :iefinition of motc: • i : c 1 i ib
services.
The purpose in requiring a motor club bond is to protect
members o f motor clubs by insur i.ng 11: lat 11: le i i 101oi: ::J i ib se i: <;r ic es
they contract for will be made available.

T h e bond is required by

law to protect parties from injury by reason of misrepresentation
or failure on the part of the principals in renie- : = M motor club
services.
P l a i n t i f f 1 s Unreasonable

Interpretation

The plaintiff's argument that the offer and sale of capital notes binds the defendant to make payment under the bond
because the parties were defrauded by the wrongful acts of the
principals of American Drivers Legal Services irl "failing or
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rendering any of the principal services" is an unreasonable
interpretation of both the bond and the statutes governing motor
clubs.
The defendant recognizes that this Court and the Utah
Supreme Court have adopted the rule that a surety bond issued by a
surety who makes insurance a business for compensation is
construed against the surety in favor of those who are insured.
Dennis Dillon Oldsmobile, GMC, Inc. v. Zdunich, 668 P.2d 557, 560
(Utah 1983).

However, both the Supreme Court and this Court have

recognized limitations to that rule.

Prior to interpreting a

motor vehicle bond in Western Surety Co. v. Murphy, 754 P.2d 1237
(Utah App.

1988), this Court gave the following guidance:
The primary rule in interpreting the contract
.is to determine what the party has intended
by looking at the entire contract and all of
its parts in relation to each other, giving an
objective and reasonable construction to the
contract as a whole.

Id. at 1240 (quoting Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105, 1107-1108
(Utah 1982).

Thus the duty of the court in interpreting the motor

club bond and the statutes governing the bond is to look at the
entire contract and to give an objective and reasonable construction to the contract as a whole.

Couch On Insurance summarized

the general rule with respect to the construction of an insurance
contract in accord with intent.
A fair and lawful interpretation is required
even where the doubts are to be resolved in
favor of an insured. The rule of favorable
construction for the insured should not be
applied so as to let down the bars established
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by the standards here and before considered,
and permit a construction which is unreasonable
and not in keeping with the language used and
the obvious intent of the parties. The
restriction of the rule to ambiguities negatives any concept of the license to apply the
rule without the restraint imposed by the
principal that the purpose of construction is
to determine the meaning of the contract
according to the clear language thereof. Thus,
in construing the language of a contractor's
bond, effect must be given to the intention
of the parties, if that intention can be found
from the language employed, notwithstanding
less ambiguous language might have been
employed. In no event should the language of
the policy be ignored, twisted or distorted.
The better statement of the rule itself
indicates that it is only where one possible
reasonable construction is balancing against
another that the rule applies.
Couch On Insurance 2d, §1587 (1984).
Defendant asserts that the plaintiff has failed to present a reasonable interpretation and construction of tt le bon,' 1 as a
whole.

Thus, the rule that the ambiguities of a contract are io

be constr ueel against 11 Ie i nsi irer shouJ d r Iot be uti 1 i zed because
the plaintiff has failed to put forth a reasonable interpretation.
Additionally, plaintiff alleges that clear language could have
beei

Llized by the defendatit.

If the language used is in keep-

ing with the intent of the parties and the purpose of the statute,
then the language used must be considered to be acceptable.
In City of Wichjta v. Home Cab Co., 101 P.2d 219 (Kan.
1940), the Kansas Appellate Court discussed the rules and
interpretation with respect to a surety bond.
In Home Cab Co. , a supersedeas sut: ety bond was i ssued to
the Home Cab Company principal, and Mary Hoffman, surety, in order
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to perfect an appeal of a Kansas Supreme Court decision to the
Supreme Court of the United States.

Following the dismissal of

the appeal by the Supreme Court of United States, a dispute arose
as to what damages the surety was liable for under the subject
bond.
In addressing the issue, the Kansas Supreme Court noted
the general rule in construction of surety bonds:
In 8 Am.Jur. 722, Bonds, §37, the rule stated
as follows: "In construing an instrument under
seal, although the courts generally adhere
closely to the letter, the prevailing rule
allows a court to place itself in the position
of the contracting parties and to consider,
in view of all the facts and circumstances
surrounding execution on the instrument, what
the parties intended. In the event the
intention of the parties is manifest, such
intent must control in the interpretation of
the instrument, regardless of the inapt
expressions or mere technical rules of
construction . . . .

The subject motor club bond in the instant case was never
intended to indemnify members who had claims unrelated to motor
club services.

Clearly, none of the victims of the fraud

perpetrated by the principals of American Drivers Legal Services
could have reasonably expected that the subject bond would cover
the unauthorized issuance of security notes.

Likewise, the State

of Utah in requiring the motor club bond did not intend that the
issuance and sale of capital notes would be covered under the
bond.

It intended to cover those services defined as motor club

services in the statute.
The plaintiff's reliance on the Utah Supreme Court deci-8-

sion of Dennis Dillon Qldsmobile, 668 P.2d 5 5 7 , is misplaced.
In Dillon, the language
were much broader than the language •„ r the defendant' - : •'-.*:.• >r <;Lub
bond.

In Dillon, both motor vehicle bonds bound the insurers "to

indemnify any and all persons, firms and corpiM.ai r::i^ for any loss
suffered

. in the penal sum of Twenty Thousand Dollars."

at 561 (emphasis added).

The court noted:

Id.

"By the literal lan-

guage of the bonds, t!le sureties rendered themselves 1iable up to
a maximum of $20,000 for any loss suffered by any and all
persons."

Id.
In the current case, the motor club bond does not provide

indemnity for any loss.

It provides coverage for losses resulting

from "misrepresentation or failure on the part of principal in
selling or rendering any of principal's services .
of Twenty-Five Thousand

.

. Dollars."

^? ^he sum

(Emphasis added)

The principals wei: e :i i: I business as a motor: c 1 \ it ai id t h e
bond was intended to cover injuries and damages resulting from
the failure to render motor club services.
The obligation of American

tv

i .:'i * ,:e:/ * .'

*

-. J ir :e

Company as expressed in the clear language of the bond is triggered upon the occurrence of one or more of the following acts by
the principals of the motor club:
1.
Ann.

Failure to fully and faithfully comply with Utah Code

§41-16-2 and its successor statutes;
2.

Fai 1 ui:e t< :) £ aj t h f u l l y f u r n i s h ai I< i rendei

to i ts i i tem-

bers any and all motor club services sold or offered by it; and
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3,

Failure to pay any fines, fees or penalties imposed

under Utah Code Ann. §41-16-2 and its successor statutes.
Under the facts of the case, as stipulated by the
parties, there have been no acts that fall into any of the preceding categories, and thus, the obligation to pay has not been triggered by any action of the principals of American Drivers Legal
Services Inc.
CONCLUSION
The plaintiff asserts that coverage under the bond is not
limited to motor club services but includes any services undertaken by the principals, including the opportunities to invest in
unauthorized securities.

Plaintiff's interpretation fails to

recognize any limitations of coverage, so long as the principals
of the motor club are offering the services, despite how unrelated
such services may be to those normally associated with motor clubs.
The defendant recognizes the rule of construction of a
surety bond issued by a surety for hire requires the bond be
construed against the defendant surety and in favoring the insurer.
However, such rule has limits and the construction or
interpretation of the bond that is construed against the surety
must maintain reasonableness and the Court cannot permit a construction which is unreasonable and not in keeping with the language used in the bond and which is not compatible to the statutes
governing the bond.
The sale of capital notes cannot be construed as being
part of motor club's services as those services are defined by
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statute.

The bond is required by law to protect parties from

injury by reason of misrepresentation or failure on the part of
the principals in rendering motor club services.

Any interpreta-

tion beyond that is unreasonable.
Based upon the foregoing, defendant respectfully requests
that this court affirm the lower court's grant of summary judgment
to defendant and affirm its order declaring that there is no coverage provided under the bond for the offer and sale of capital
notes by American Drivers Legal Services Inc. to its members and
others based upon the false statements regarding the nature and
quality of the capital notes and that defendant has no liability
to plaintiff.
DATED this 18th day of April, 1990.
STRONG & HANNI

,/oyce
for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this

IQ

day of April, 1990,

a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage
prepaid, to:
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General
NEAL T. GOOCH
Assistant Attorney General
Tax & Bus. Regulation Division
130 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
David E. Leta
Attorney for David J. Olsen
HANSEN Sc ANDERSON
Sixth Floor
Valley Tower Building
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2018
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ADDENDUM

-1

Joseph J. Joyce, #4857
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant
Sixth Floor Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH by and through
HAROLD C. YANCEY, Insurance
Commissioner,

J U D G M E N T

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No.

AMERICAN MANUFACTURERS
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,

Judge

C87 7330

Timothy R. Hanson

Defendant and
Third-Party Plaintiff,
vs.
DAVID J. OLSEN,
Third-Party Defendant.
The motion of defendant American Manufacturers Mutual
Insurance Company for summary judgment and plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment came on for hearing before the Honorable Timothy
R. Hanson, on September 25, 1989.

Plaintiff, State of Utah, was

represented by Neal T. Gooch, Assistant Attorney General.

Defendant and third-party plaintiff, American Manufacturers
Mutual was represented by Joseph J. Joyce, of the law firm of
Strong & Hanni.

Third-party defendant, David J. Olsen, was

represented by Mark R. Gaylord of the law firm of Hansen &
Anderson.

After hearing arguments of counsel, and considering

the stipulation of facts submitted by the parties and being
otherwise fully advised, the Court determines:
1.

There are no genuine issues of material fact

pursuant to the stipulation of facts executed by the parties.
2.

Under a reasonable interpretation of the subject

statutes and subject bond, the Court finds that there is no
liability imposed upon insurer.

The Court finds that the bond

does not include the sale of capital notes by the principals of
American Drivers Legal Services.
3.

The terms and conditions of the bond are not

ambiguous.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

The motion of defendant American Manufacturers

Mutual Insurance Company for summary judgment is hereby granted
and judgment is hereby entered in favor of American Manufacturers
Mutual Insurance Company against plaintiff, no cause of action.
2.

Plaintifffs motion for partial summary judgment is

hereby denied.
2

3,

The court determines that there is no just reason

for delay in entering this judgment as a final judgment, and the
clerk of the court is so directed to enter it as a final judgment
in accordance with the provisions of Rule 54(b) Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
DATED this

/

day of

/

^/^xA^jjiu^y

, 1989,

ambthy R. Hanson
)istrict Court Judge

ATTEST
?st*e£^^//£??^^

By
DepLt; Cc.k

r* *>

